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Summary  findings
Domac  provides  a descriptive  analysis  of credit and  given  policy  shift.
monetary  policies  in Malaysia  and investigates  the  Policymakers  should weigh  the distributional
distributional  consequences  of monetary  policy  there by  consequences  of policy  actions  and should consider
focusing  on small  and medium-size  industries  and large  measures  to alleviate  the disproportionate  impact  that
manufacturing  firms.  market  imperfections  have on small  and medium-size
Domac  suggests  that "payoff"  or "default"  risk  - industries.
as captured  by the spread between  safe  and risky  debt - Measures  to alleviate  information  asymmetry  in credit
is still  well above  its pre-crisis  level,  underscoring  the  markets  - including  the promotion  of cooperative  or
increased  agency  costs of external finance.  The decline  in  mutual  guarantee  schemes  for small  and medium-size
lending  activity  in the first  half of 1998 can be attributed  enterprises  - are one useful  option. Groups of firms  in
to the reduced  supply  of bank credit relative  to demand.  Southern  Europe have  made wide use of mutual
Empirical  results  from vector  autoregression  analysis  guarantee  schemes  -usually  within a specific  industry
demonstrate  that monetary  tightening  disproportionately  - to provide  a privately  organized  "insurance  system"
affects  small  and medium-size  enterprises.  for lending  banks  that allows  the banks  to rely less  on the
Moreover,  monetary  shocks  contribute  substantially  assets  of individual  companies  within the group in
more  to small  and medium-size  firms' variance  of  making  loan decisions.  The pooling effects  of such a
production (71 percent)  than to that of large  system  would reduce the risk  to the bank of default  and
manufacturing  firms (30  percent).  would  give  members  of the society  an incentive  to reveal
These findings  corroborate  the notion that small  and  information  to the society  that they might  hesitate  to
medium-size  industries  face greater  market  give  to the bank.
imperfections,  which in turn magnify  the effects  of a
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The initial policy response to the Asian crisis which, inter alia, included tight monetary
and fiscal policy along with structural measures, has attracted  as much attention as the crisis
itself.  In particular, many experts questioned the effectiveness of the use of high interest rates to
defend the currency, to restore confidence, and to attract capital inflows.  It has been argued that
high interest rates not only undermined the recovery prospects of the economies in the region,
but  also that they increased the fragility of the banking sector.'  There are, however,  studies
which dispute this argument and contend that the monetary tightening was neither excessive nor
a major factor contributing to the sharp decline in output. 2
The different conclusions reached by different studies appears to stem from the fact that
those who argue that monetary policy tightening was not extreme and that it was unlikely to have
been a major factor behind the output decline focus largely on aggregate consequences of policy
actions.  By contrast, those who claim that monetary policy was excessively tight and that it
contributed  to  increased  bankruptcies,  thus  undermining  prospects  for  economic  recovery,
recognize the importance of distributional consequences ofpolicy  actions.
More specifically, the first view  -- often characterized as the money view -- argues that
higher  default-risk-free  interest  rates  following  a  monetary  contraction  decreases  desired
Feldstein (1998) contends that an increase in interest rates will lead to widespread bankruptcies when: (i)inflation is low;
(ii) the roll over of bank loans and the demand for the domestic currency hinges more on confidence than on interest rates;
and (iii) the failures will reduce the prospect of loan repayment.  Although it is true that the depreciation would increase the
risk  of bankruptcies  among companies  with large foreign debt,  the overall damnage  would  be  less  extensive than  the
bankruptcies caused by a very high domestic interest rate that  would hurt every company.  Furthermore, as Drazen and
Masson (1994) have demonstrated,  if the costs of implementing tight policies are too high, the temporary policy would
actually  reduce credibility because  investors know that the policy could not be sustained.  Similarly, to the extent that
investors believe that high interest rates are not sustainable in the presence of a fragile banking sector and to the extent they
anticipate a government bailout of the financial sector, they would expect that tight monetary policy will eventually be
abandoned.  As a result, higher interest rates will not be an effective tool to defend the domestic currency.  See also Stiglitz
(1998), Ding, Domac, and Ferri (1998), and Domav and Ferri (1998) for more on the potential adverse consequences of
high interest rates.
2  See, for instanlce,  Lane, Ghosh. Hamann, I'hillips, Schulze-Ghattas and Tsikate (1998) as well as Goldfajn and Baig (1998).
Iinvestment by  firms  and households. 3 While  desired investment declines,  the reduction  in
business and lhousehold capital affects the least productive projects.  Since the most profitable
projects  continue  to  be  funded,  there  are  no  direct  efficiency  losses  associated  with  the
distributional aspects of the policy-induced interest rate increase.
On the otler  hand, the second view -- often referred to as the credit view -- analyzes the
ways in which mnonetary  policy can influence the interaction between borrowers and lenders in
financial markets and  the resulting  consequences for  economic activity. 4 By  emphasizing a
combinatioti of capital market imperfections and portfolio balance effects based  on imperfect
asset substituitability, the credit view  suggests the possibility that  the policy's  incidence may
differ substantially across agents in the economy.  Moreover, the impact of policy shifts has to do
with the characteristics of the individuals that are not linked to the inherent creditworthiness of
the investment projects.  An entrepreneur may be turned down by the lender simply because of a
currently low net worth, in spite of the social return to the project.  It is, therefore, important to
understand  whether  the  decline  in  investment  caused  by  monetary  policy  shifts  has  these
consequences.
The paper has two main goals.  First, it attempts to provide a brief descriptive analysis of
the credit  and monetary conditions in the aftermath of the crisis  in Malaysia, with  a specific
reference  to  the  credit  channel  literature.  Second,  it  aims  to  empirically  investigate  the
distributional consequences of policy actions by focusing on the response of small and mediurn
size industries and large manufacturing firms to monetary policy shifts in Malaysia.  Since the
3  'Ihe money view relies on four important assumptions: (i) the central bank must control the supply of outside money for
which there are imperfect substitutes; (ii) the central bank can influence real and nominal short-term interest rates  -- prices
do not adjust instantaneously; (iii) policy induced changes in real interest rates have an impact on longer-term interest rates
affecting household and business  spending decisions; and (iv) changes in interest  sensitive  spending in response  to a
monetary policy innovation correspond reasonably well with observed output responses to such innovations.
4  As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out, the credit view should not be considered as a distinct, free-standing alternative
to the money view, but rather as a set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects.  As they
2existing literature on this topic has largely concentrated on industrialized countries, this paper
will contribute to the literature by considering a developing nation -- Malaysia.
The  results  from  the  descriptive  analysis  suggest  that  "payoff'  or  "default"  risk,  as
captured by the spread between risky and safe debt, is still well above its pre-crisis level, thus
highlighting the increased  agency  costs of  external finance.  The empirical  results  from the
vector autoregression analysis demonstrate that monetary tightening has a larger impact on small
medium size industries (SMIs) than it does on large manufacturing firms (LMFs).  The findings
also underscore that the effect of monetary shocks on the production of SMIs is more persistent
than that of LMFs,  and monetary shocks contribute substantially more to the variance of the
production of SMIs than that of LMFs.  Therefore, the findings of this paper lend support to the
notion that SMIs face greater market imperfections  -- imperfections which in turn magnify the
effects of a given policy slhift.
I'ihe remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the analytical
framework for evaluating disruptions to the credit market.  Section 3, drawing on the framework,
provides  a descriptive analysis of the credit and monetary conditions.  Section 4 presents  the
empirical framework and results.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Identifying Credit Market Disruptions:  A General Framework
According to the money view,  reductions in the quantity of outside money increase real
rates of return, which in turn leads to a decline in investment.  Since this theory is based on the
notion that there are no externalities or market imperfections, only the least socially productive
projects drop out.  Although following a monetary contraction, capital stock is marginally lower,
the allocation of the decline across sectors is nonetheless socially efficient.
suggest, the tern  "credit view'  or "credit channel" is something of a misnomer; the credit channel is an enhancement
3The credit view, on the other hand,  argues that the direct effects of monetary  policy on
interest  rates  are  augmented  by  endogenous  changes  in  external  finance  premium  --  the
difference in cost between funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated
internally  (by retaining earnings).  The magnitude  of the  external  finance  premium  reflects
imperfections in the credit market  -- imperfections that  create a wedge  between the expected
return received by the lenders and the cost faced by potential borrowers.  This theory argues that
a change in monetary policy will alter the external finance premium in the same direction.  As a
result of this additional policy effect on the external finance premium,  the effect of monetary
policy on the cost of borrowing and on real spending, as well as real activity, is amplified.
Why  should policy  shifts induced by  the central bank have  an  impact on the  external
finance premium in credit markets?  The credit view offers two distinct linkages arising from
information problems  in  credit  markets:  those  that  operate  through  effects  on  firms'  and
households'  balance  sheets  -- a balance  sheet  channel  -- and  those  that  operate  through  effects
on bank lending -- a bank lending channel.5
Table 1: The Link Between Monetary Policy and Output
Types of Monetary Transmission Channels According to the Credit View
Bank Lending Channel  Balance Sheet Channel
Mtznbank  depositst=>bank  IoansT=*IT=*Y7  MlPet=P>adverse  selection;,  moral hazard4K>lendingT=lT4=I>YT
Cash Flow Channel  Unanticipated Price  Household
Level Channel  Liquidity Effects
MT=*  i4-=>cash  flowl'=>  MT=1  unanticipated  Ptf  MT=>PJ=>financial
adverse  selection 4-, moral  =>adverse  selectionl,  assetsT  =:>likelihood  of
hazardJLoendingt=, IT=: Yt  moral  hazard-=>lendingT  financial  distress4->
=m  rt=> Yt  consumer  durable  and
housing  expendituret=>
Yt
MT': expansionary  monetaly  policy;  l: investment  spending;  Y: GDP;  P: price  level;  Pe: equity  prices;  i: interest  rates
mechanism, not a truly independent or parallel channel.
See  Table  1.  which draws  on  Mishkin (1996),  for  a  schematic presentation of  the  transmission  of  monetary  policy
according to the credit view.
4The balance sheet channel stems from the fact that monetary policy has non-neutral effects
on the balance sheet of firms.  A tightening of monetary policy stance leads to a decline in the
net worth of firms for two reasons.  First, as contractionary monetary policy causes interest rates
to  rise,  the  servicing  of  outstanding  debt  becomes  more  expansive  and  firms  experience
decreasing cash flows.  Second, rising rates are followed by declines in asset prices.  As a result,
the value of marketable collateral declines, and the wedge between the interest rates at which
corporations can borrow and the yields on otherwise analogous risk-free assets rises.  These
adverse developments lead to more stringent conditions under which external finance becomes
available.  In  practice,  the  extemal  cost  of  finance  rises,  which  ultimately  causes  interest-
sensitive expenditures such as investment to decline.
A subset of the balance sheet channel, referred as the cash flow channel, operates through
its effects on cash flow. 6 Expansionary monetary policy, which lowers the interest rate,  also
leads to an improvement in corporate balance sheets since it increases cash flow.  The increase in
cash flow improves the balance sheet in that it raises the liquidity of the firm (or household) and
thus makes it easier for lenders to know whether the firm (or household) will be able to pay its
bills.  Consequently, the  adverse  selection and  moral  hazard  problems  become  less  severe,
leading to an increase in economic activity.
The bank  lending channel is based  on the notion that  banks play a  special role in  the
financial  system  in  that  they  are particularly  well  suited  to  solve  asymmetric  information
problems in the credit market.  Due to the special role of banks, certain borrowers will not have
access to the credit  markets unless they borrow  from banks.  As  long as there  is no perfect
substitutability of retail bank deposits with  other sources of  funds, the operation  of the bank
6  To save space, unanticipated price level channel and household liquidity effects will not be discussed here.  See Mishkin
(1996) for a comprehensive discussion of these balance sheet channels.
5lending channel of monetary transmission can be explained as follows.  Relaxation of monetary
policy, which increases both bank reserves and bank deposits, raises the quantity of bank loans
available.  Since many borrowers rely on bank loans to finance their activities, this rise in loans
will  lead to  an  increase in  investment (and possibly  consumer) spending.  This  implies  that
monetary policy shifts will have a greater effect on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
that are relatively dependent on bank loans, than it has on large firms, that can directly access the
credit market via stock and bond markets without going through banks. 7
Box 1. What are the Adverse Consequences  of Increases  in Interest  Rates?
A quick  review  of the literature  points out three main categories  of the adverse  effects  of increases
in interest rates  on both lending  and aggregate  economic  activity.
First, as Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981) demonstrated,  asymmetric  information  and the resulting  adverse
selection  problem  can lead to credit rationing in which some borrowers  are denied loans even  when they
are willing to pay a higher interest rate.  Therefore,  a higher interest rate leads to even greater adverse
selection;  because of the resulting increase in adverse selection,  banks will want to make fewer loans,
possibly producing a steep decline in lending that will lead to substantial decline in investment  and
aggregate  economic  activity.
Second, increases  in interest  rates have  a significant  impact  on the balance  sheets of both firms and
households.  As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) pointed out, a rise in interest rates, and therefore in
households' and finns'  interest payments,  decreases firms' cash flow, which causes a deterioration in
their balance  sheets. This, in turn, makes it harder  for lenders  to know  whether  the firm or household  will
be able to pay its bills. Consequently,  adverse  selection  and moral hazard  problems  become more severe
for potential  lenders  to these  firms and households,  leading  to a decline in lending  and economic  activity.
Third, increases in interest rates have an important effect on bank balance sheets.  Since banks
typically borrow short and lend long, a rise in interest rates directly causes a decline in net worth (the
interest  rate rise lowers the value of assets with longer duration  more than it raises the value of liabilities
with shorter duration). Therefore,  even if the credit quality of banks  were to remain unaffected,  a rise in
interest  rates causes a decline in net worth which  then leads  to a decline  in bank lending.
An additional reason for SMEs being disproportionately affected by credit channel effects
emanates from the possibility  that the monetary  squeeze  leads to  a flight  to quality  in  bank
lending.  More  specifically,  banks  may  respond  to  the  monetary  restriction,  not  only  by
restraining  credit  generally,  but  also  by  adopting  more  stringent  lending  policies  vis-a-vis
7  See Certler and Gilchrist (1994) for more on this.
6customers that are perceived to be less credit worthy. 8 That is, when a deposit drain squeezes
their resources, banks will attempt to select customers who are ex ante more credit-worthy: e.g.
those  lhaving a  more  established  credit  record  or  those  able  to  post  more  collateral.9 As
underscored by Bemanke,  Gertler, and  Gilchrist (1996), the flight  to quality  in bank  lending
may, in turn, trigger afinancial accelerator effect along the following causal chain: the negative
shock pushes the economy into a recession; the recession tightens borrowing constraints; tighter
borrowing constraints amplify the recession, and the cycle goes on.'0
The flight to quality in bank lending could also come in the form of banks' increasing their
holdings  of  government  securities  in  relation  to  their  assets,  in  response  to  a tightening  of
monetary conditions.  This, combined with the decrease  in loans in relative to  bank assets, is
often interpreted as a sign of a declining bank willingness to extend new loans.
Finally, there are two additional factors causing SMEs to be disproportionately penalized
by the credit channel effects.  First, to the extent that the smaller banks are viewed as less likely
to be bailed out by the Government, they may be the ones to suffer most in the deposit flight." 1
The fact that SMEs, more than other firms, typically rely on small bank lending implies that an
additional credit squeeze may hurt them disproportionately.'2 Second, for a small firm, the cost
of administering bankruptcy proceedings is larger, relative to the amount borrowed, than for a
8  Bernanke.  Gertler, and Gilchrist  (1996) report evidence  in line with this hypothesis.  A  negative  bias  similar to that
regarding SMEs might apply to fast-growing firms, since they have a higher ratio of expected future profits to the current
value of physical assets and thus can provide lower collateral.
9  Lenders perceive SMEs to be more risky since they generally have a shorter track record and typically release less --and
less structured-- information.
10  See  Kyiotaki and Moore (1997) for more on this.  Lang and Nakamura (1995) report evidence of a flight to quality in
bank lending in the US.
II  Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1997) contend that small banks, rather than large ones, are more likely to be hit by monetary
restrictions.
12  Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) demonstrate a strong correlation between relative size of the lending bank and relative
size of the borrowing firm in the US: small firms tend to borrow from small banks and large firms tend to borrow from
large banks.
7large firm.  Therefore, a rise in market interest rates will lead banks more than capital market
lenders.
In a crisis  situation, during which the relationship between monetary policy instruments
and nominal income changes drastically, assessing the monetary policy stance becomes intricate.
Consequently, it may be misleading to focus solely on key indicators of monetary policy when
evaluating the monetary policy stance and credit conditions in order to detect "a credit crunch".
Evaluation  of  monetary  and  credit  aggregates  must  be  accompanied  with  a  more  detailed
investigation  of the  channels  through  which  firms,  banks,  and  households  are  affected  by
changes in monetary policy.
Box 2. Illustration  of the Relevant  Spreads
The following  expression  presents  the set of interest  rate spreads  which capture the credit channel
effects  of the transmission  mechanism  of monetary  policy:
SPRo  = LR-TB  = SPRI  + SPR 2
where
LR  = lending  rate;
TB = Treasury  bond  rate;
SPR 1 = corporate  bond rate - Treasury  bond  rate;
SPR 2 = lending  rate -commercial  paper  rate;
The difference  between  rates on corporate  and on Treasury  bonds (SPRI) measures  the general  risk
premium  as it is perceived  by the market. If the balance  sheet  effect is at work,  we expect  that this spread
will increase after the monetary restriction, reflecting the fact that private sector debt has become
relatively  riskier  vis-a-vis sovereign  debt.
The spread between the lending rate and commercial  paper (SPR 2) is a proxy for the lending
chainel effect. The difference  between lending  rates and commercial  paper rates quantifies  the premium
that bank-dependent  borrowers  must pay in order to raise external  finance relative to those firms able to
issue debt on the market.  The lending channel effect contends that this spread will increase in the
aftennath of the monetary  squeeze.
Source: Doma,c  and Ferri (1998)
As  widely acknowledged,  a  decline in  either  bank  loans  or  a  decline  in  their  growth
following a monetary tightening is not sufficient to pin down an adverse movement in banks'
loan  supply.  This  is  because  the  decline  could  be  induced  either  by  the  corporate  sector
8demanding less credit -- because fewer investments are undertaken --  or by bank reluctance to
lend.  By contrast, if the decline in (the dynamics of) bank loans  --  a quantity variable --  is
coupled witlh  a widening of the spread between bank lending rates and interest rate on non-bank
debt (See Box 2) -- a price based variable --, then it can be argued that an adverse shift in the
bank supply of loans is curtailing credit.  In fact, such a  situation is consistent with only two
possibilities: either supply has declined whereas demand has not, or supply has declined more
than demand has.
3. Descriptive Analysis  of the Credit  and Monetary Conditions in  the Aftermath of the
Crisis
Many years ago, Irving Fisher (1933) emphasized the interaction of debt and speculation in
describing business and credit cycles:
Thus, over-investment and over-speculation are often  important; but they would have far
less  seri  .ous  results  were  they  not  conducted  with  borrowed  money.  That  is,  over-
indebtedness mnay  lend importance to over-investment or to over-speculation.  The same is
true  as to  over-confidence.  I fancy  that over-confidence  seldom  does  any great  harm
except when, as, and, iJf it beguiles its victims into debt.
The excessive credit growth became particularly acute in Malaysia during  1995-97 (Figure 1).13
The Central Bank, in tact, considered the expansion of loans to be excessive but, in light of the
potentially adverse consequences on highly leveraged Malaysian corporations, was reluctant to
respond by raising the intervention rate.  In October of 1997, the Central Bank responded to the
excessive credit growth by issuing a directive to limit the growth of credit lines on the grounds
that it might have less serious consequences than increasing the interest rates.  The adoption of
13  Excessive credit growth (EXCR) is calculated as:
EXCRt  =  A,-  Alogy,
Ml -
where A is the first difference operator. D, M, and y are, respectively, the total domestic credit, the broad money stock, and
the real GDP.  This measure assumes that money demand has a unitary elasticity with respect to real income.
9this directive also seems consistent with the fact that Malaysia increased its intervention rate less
than other crisis countries did (Figure 2).  With the benefit of hindsight, it is quite likely that this
directive played -- possibly by causing banks to over-react in the wake of the crisis -- a role, both
in  curtailing the availability of credit  and in increasing  lending rates relative to  other market
rates.
Figure 1. Excess Domestic Credit Growth  Figure 2. Evolution of Overnight Rates
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In line with the authorities' efforts to invigorate the economy by engineering an increase in
domestic demand, interest rates have declined noticeably (Figure 5).  Despite the marked decline,
the annual growth rate of loans has remained anemic and, indeed, turned negative in real terms in
September (Figure 3).  Although this observation appears, at first blush, to imply that the slow-
down in lending largely emanates from the demand side, several comments are in order.
First,  the  base  lending  rate  is  more  reflective  of  administered  changes  and  more
representative  of  the  lending  rate  charged  to  prime-customers.  The  average  lending  rate
incorporates  the  lending  rate  that  is  charged  to  borrowers  perceived  to  be  more  risky.
Accordingly, an increasing spread between the latter and the former implies that banks are still
10reluctant to extend new loans (Figure 6).  14  In fact, this observation suggests that the adverse
selection problem has become more severe in recent months.
Figutre 3. Growth Rate of Real Loans (year-on-year)  Figure 4. Growth Rate of Real Loans by Type of Banks
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Figure 5. Evolution of Average Lending rate  Figure 6. Average Lending Rate and Base Lending Rate
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Second, the  increasing share of revolving credit and overdraft in total loans suggests that
borrowers are  relying  more  on  shorter  term  and  generally  pre-committed  facilities.  This,
combined with  the  sharp  decline in  lending  activity,  furthier underscores  bank  reluctance  to
14  The base lending rate (BLR) for commercial banks is calculated as:
BLR= [-IR  *  80%]+2.25%
l- SJ?R%
where IR and SRR are the Central Bank intervention rate and statutory reserve requirement.  Prior to September 1, 1998
the BLR was computed using average KLIBOR in lieu of the intervention rate and the fixed administrative charge was
2.5% instead of 2.25%.
11extend  new loans  (Figure  7).  In addition, to  the extent that  shorter-term and  pre-committed
facilities are utilized mainly by large firms, as was shown by Ellihausen and Wolken (1990),
SMEs without commitments may find themselves served last, if at all.
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a: Domestic  Commercial  Banks
Third,  available  evidence also  suggests that  there  has  been a flight  to quality --  a re-
allocation of banks assets towards  government securities  away from  lending to the corporate
sector.  As  can be  seen  from  Figure  8, banks  have increased  their  holdings  of  government
securities  in  relation  to  their  total  assets  since  January  1998  --  a  sign  of  declining  bank
willingness to lend as banks devote an increasing share of their assets to securities.
Fourth, a reshuffling of deposits across banks took place as depositors enacted aflight  to
quality.  The  flight  to  quality  took  place  from  finance  companies  and  merchant  banks  to
commercial banks (Figures 9-11).  Perceived by depositors to be less likely to fail, foreign banks
also  experienced  an  inflow  of  deposits  from  domestic  banks  between  December  1997  and
January 1998.  The flight from domestic to foreign banks has been less pronounced: the market
share of foreign banks in total deposits has increased from 20.9 percent in January 1997 to 21.5
percent in December  1998, reaching  its peak of 23.1% in January  1998 (Figure  12).  To the
12extent  that some customers were exclusively borrowing from those  banks that experienced a
deposit flight, at least temporarily, such borrowers may have found it particularly  difficult to
obtain new credit.  In fact, at a time of heightened corporate risk and of tight liquidity, banks are
very  likely  to  turn  down  new  credit  applicants  with  whom  they  do  not  already  have  an
established customer relationship.
Figure 9. Fixed Deposits at Commercial  Bankss  Figure  10. Fixed Deposits at Merchant  Banksa
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Figure 11. Fixed Deposits at Finance Companies
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Fifth,  evolution  of  the  yield  curve,  particularly  beginning  with  September  1997  and
throughout 1998 (see Box 3), suggests that economic agents expect short-term rates to increase
(or they expect future monetary tightening) as demonstrated by the steep upward slope of the
yield curve.
13Box 3. Evolution of the Yield Curve
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14The steepening of the yield curve is also consistent with a future decline in economic activity. 15
Indeed, the information content reflects the expected effects of monetary policy via interest rates
on economic activity.  The expectation of future decline in economic activity, in turn, should
have an adverse effect on lending activity.  Although the relationship between monetary policy
actions and the term structure is unlikely to remain invariant over time, and may be affected by
other factors such as changes in expected inflation and in the real ex ante long-termn  rate, the
present situation may be explained in either one of two ways: either agents view current declines
as insufficient to revive economic activity or they do not view policy actions as effective.
Finally, as was explained previously, a decline in loan growth or in the lending rate by
itself is insufficient to determine whether the decline in bank lending arises from a shift in either
demand or supply.  The evolution of the lending activity should be accompanied with that of the
spreads presented in Box 2.16 Although the spread between the average lending rate and the 3-
month T-bill (Figure 13), which captures both the general risk premium and the bank dependent
borrowers'  specific spread, has declined in recent  months, it is still above pre-crisis levels.'7
More precisely, in the case of commercial and merchant banks, the spread reached its historic
peak during the earlier part of 1998, before declining towards the end of 1998.  It still remains,
however, well above the pre-crisis period.  The spread in the case of finance companies rose in
March  1998 and, thereafter, exhibited a downward trend.  Overall, the increase in the spread in
the case of finance companies is less pronounced compared to that of commercial and merchant
banks.
i  See Estrella and Mishkin (1995) for more on the role of the term structure in the conduct of monetary policy.
16  Indeed, numerous studies demonstrated that increases in the interest rate between risky and safe debt are associated with
subsequent  downturns  in  output  [see,  for  example,  Stock  and  Watson  (1989)  and  Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1989)].
Consequently, the behavior of the spread also has implications for economic activity.
17  Put differently, an increase in this spread can also be interpreted as a tightening in the terms of external finance.
15Figure 13. Spread between  Lending  Rate and 3-Month  T-bill Rate 18
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The overall analysis combining the evolution of the spread -- the price variable -- and that
of  the lending activity  -- the  quantity  variable -- along with  the  other key  indicators  of the
framework suggests the  following:  (i)  evolution  of  the  spread  between  risky  and  safe  debt
implies that "payoff'  or "default" risk is still well above its pre-crisis level, thus underscoring the
increased agency costs of external finance; (ii) the decline in lending activity between the end of
1997 and first half of 1998 can be explained by the reduction in bank credit supply relative to
demand; (iii) it appears that the decline in demand has probably played a more prominent role in
I  Three-month moving average.
16contributing to the sharp slow-down in lending activity during the second half of 1998 compared
to the earlier period; (iv) the sharp decline in the growth rate of loans by finance companies --
which in part can be attributed to closures -- when combined with relatively moderate increase in
the spread, can be interpreted as the decline in demand contributing to the slow-down in lending
activity more than in the case of commercial and merchant banks; and (v) customers borrowing
exclusively  from  banks  that  experienced  deposit  flight,  namely  merchant  banks,  finance
companies, antd,  for  a very short period,  domestic banks, are likely to find it more difficult to
acquire new credit.  Considering that SMEs usually have a customer relationship with only a
single bank, while large firms usually have customer relationships with several banks, the latter
can typically  find  a  bank  that  is  able  to  make  loans.  Thus,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the
phenomenon of deposit flight will hurt SMEs disproportionately.'9
4. Empirical  Framework  and the Main Results
4.1. Background
A growing body of research -- mainly on the industrialized countries -- has established the
empirical  significance  of  credit  market  imperfections  and  has  provided  evidence  on
dispropotionate  effects  of  monetary  policy  changes  on  bank-dependent  borrowers.  More
spefically, this strand of the literature has demonsted that the informational frictions that add the
costs of external finance apply largely to younger firms and firms that are not well collaterlized.
On average, these are small firms [Gertler and Gilchrist(1994)].  Smaller firms depend heavily
on intermediary credit, while large firms make far greater use of direct credit, including equity,
public debt, and commercial paper [see Gertler and Hubbard (1988)].  Morever, beginning with a
Beyond  the possible  discrimination  against  SMEs,  there may be particularly  severe  discrimination  against  newly founded
firms. In a period  when  credit  is tight,  banks are unwilling  to take  on new loan customers,  so that people  who want to start
new  firms  often  cannot  obtain  credit.
17study conducted by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988), a large number of investigations on
investment have highlighted that smaller firms are more likely to face liquidity constraints.
These findings, in trmn,  imply that monetary policy shifts have an important distributional
aspect that cannot be tackled within the traditional money view. 20 Furthermore, since smaller
and faster growing firms are likely to be firms with highly profitable investment opportunities,
the fact that they bear a disproportionate share of the burden imposed by a recession has serious
consequences for social welfare: not only are recessions associated with both aggregate output
and investment declines, but the declines themselves are inefficient.
While the largest industrialized countries have been the subject of the above mentioned
studies,  very  little  wvork  has  been  conducted  to  investigate  the  validity  of  distributional
consequences of monetarv policy shifts for developing countries. 21 This section attempts to fill
an important void by investigating whether monetary policy shifts have a greater influence on the
production of sinall and medium sized manufacturing firms than on that of larger firms in one
such developing country, Malaysia.
The first step  of the  empirical  investigation is to  construct a  reasonable proxy  for  the
production of small and medium sized as well as large manufacturing firms.  To this end, the
paper relies on the information published by the Federeation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM)
on  small  and  medium  sized  industries (SMIs)  and  on  industrial  surveys  conducted  by  the
Department of Statistics.  Appendix  1 presents both information on SMIs in Malaysia as well as
the compostion of manufacturing component of the industrial production.  Available information
suggests that the  majority of  SMIs operate  in: (i)  food  and  beverages;  (ii) fabricated metal
products; (iii) wood and wood products; and (iv) basic metal.  Using the corresponding weights
20  See Cecchetti (1995) for more on this.
18of these components from Table Al  of Appendix 1, the paper calculates the production of SMIs,
while the production of large industries is calculated by using the remaining components and
their corresponding weights.
Figures  14 and 15 illustrate the evolution of the constructed series for the production of
SMIs and large manufacturing firms (LMFs).  It is clear that the downward trend in production is
more prominent in the case of SMIs compared to that of LMFs.  Indeed, the growth rate in the
index averaged over  1997 and  1998 for SMI production is almost -1.4  percent, while that  of
large industries is around 1.8 percent.
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Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics of respective index of SMIs and large industries
between 1992:01 and 1998:12.  It is interesting to note that the variability of SMIs' production is
almost twice as much as that of large industries, as demonstrated by the coefficient variation.  A
possible  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  is provided  by  Gertler  and  Gilchirst  (1994)  who
21  A recent study by Domac and Ferri  (1998) on Korea concluded that SMEs suffer more than other businesses do from the
adverse ceffects  of the credit channel.
19suggest that large firms smooth the impact of variation in demand by contracting out to SMIs in
good times, but servicing all business internally in economic downturns.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Manufacturing Production (1992:01-1998:12)a
Large Manufacturing Firms  SMIs
Mean  0.71  0.51
Median  -0.18  -0.25
Maximum  16.75  18.76
Minimum  -14.83  -16.39
Standard Deviation  6.28  8.22
Skewness  0.19  0.21
Kurtosis  2.86  2.58
Coefficient Variation  8.85  16.10
Jarque-Bera  0.59  1.23
Observations  83.00  83.00
a: Growth  rate of the respective  index.
4.2. Responses to Policy Shocks by SMIs and Large Manufacturing Firms: Evidence from
Vector Autoregressions
Quantifying the effects of monetary shocks has been one of the most significant challenges
of  empirical  monetary  economics.  Economic  research  has  historically  employed  several
competing approaches to identify policy effects from the observed data. On the one hand, there
are techniques based on the Choleski decomposition of vector autoregression (VAR) residuals.
Within this approach, the main debated issue pertains to whether an indicator of monetary policy
exists which can justifiably  be placed within a Wold-causal ordering.  On the other hand, the
approach proposed  by  Romer  and  Romer  (1989,  1990) uses  episodes  viewed  as  monetary
contractions  as  a  means  of  identifying  monetary  shocks.  Here  the  key  issue  causing
20disagreement is whlether such episodes can be reasonably considered exogenous with respect to
other shocks to the economy. 22
Since the seminal work of Sims (1980), VAR models have become an increasingly popular
tool for empirical studies of the monetary transmission mechanism. 23  A VAR is a system of
ordinary least-squares regressions, in which  each of a set of variables is regressed  on lagged
values of both itself and the other variables in the set.  VARs have proved to be a convenient
method of summarizing the dynamic relationships among variables, since once estimated, they
can be  used to  simulate the response over time  of any variable in the set to  either an "own"
disturbance or a disturbance to any other variable in the system.
This  paper,  in  line  with  the  general  convention  in  the  empirical  literature  on  the
transmission of monetary policy, also employs a VAR model.  The basic strategy for identifying
an exogenous  shock to monetary  policy is to  focus on the disturbance term  in the following
regression equation:
St=  ''(Rt)  + as 5t  (1)
Where St stands for the policy instrument; 'V  is a linear function; Qe  summarizes the information
set that the Central Bank considers when determining S,; a is a positive number; and finally st is
a serially uncorrelated shock that is orthogonal to the elements of 0,  and has unit variance.  The
information  set  consists  of  the  past  history  of  all  variables  in  the  system  and  the  time  t
realizations of subset of those  variables.  The dynamic response  of a variable to  a monetary
22  Evaluation of these competing approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.  Interested readers, however, should refer to
Chirstiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996a., 1996b), Zha (1997), and Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox (1997).
23  Sec Watson (1994) as well as Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox (1997) for a comprehensive discussion on the use of
VARs and the role of econometric models in the conduct of monetary policy.
21policy shock can be captured by the coefficients in the regression of the variable on current and
lagged values of the fitted residuals in the above equation. 24
Following  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992),  Chirstiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Evans  (1996a,
1996b), and others, the paper employs the short-term interest rate, namely the overnight money
rate (R), which is under the direct influence of the Central bank, as an indicator of the stance of
monetary policy.25 Consequently, the disturbances to the overnight money rate equation in the
VAR are identified as shocks to monetary policy.  The response of other variables in the system
to  an  interest  rate  shock  is  interpreted  as  the  structural  responses  of  those  variables  to  an
unpredicted shift in monetary policy.
More specifically, the VAR system in the case of SMIs (in the case of LMFs) includes the
log of SMI production  [YSMI]  (yL-) along with the log of real effective exchange rate  [RER],
ovemiight  money rate [R], and the spread between the average lending rate and the 3-month T-
bill rate  [SPR], in that order. 26 This ordering, consistent with the Central Bank's behavior in
practice,  assumes  that  the  nmonetary authority  looks  at  the  contemporaneous  state  of  real
economic activity (Ysmi  or YL) as well as the real effective exchange rate (RER) before deciding
on  st.27  The spread  between the average lending  rate and  the 3-month T-bill  rate (SPR)  is
24  See Chirstiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (I 996b) for a detailed technical exposition of this strategy.
25  In defining the transmission mechanism. exogeneity of monetary instrument is important in two senses: one economic and
one econometric.  In an economic sense, the monetary policy instrument must, at the margin, be controllable by the Central
Bank: the endogenous response of the instrument to developments in the economy must take place merely via the Central
Bank's  reaction function.  Exogeneity, in the  econometric sense, entails  that enough  restrictions be imposed  upon the
system to allow the identification of the Central Bank's reaction function and the shocks pertaining to it.
26  There is an issue of whether the variables  in a VAR need to be stationary.  Sims (1980) and others recommend against
differencing even if the variables  contain unit root.  They contend that the goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the
interrelationships among  the variables, not  to determine estimates.  The  main argument against differencing  is that  it
"throws  away"  inforrnation concerning  the  co-movements  in  the data.  Although  the  results  of  the  Phillips-Perron
stationarity tests indicate that variables involved are integrated order of 1, I(l),  following  the argument put forth above,
variables  are not differenced.  By not  imposing co-integrating relations,  the estimation  avoids a long-run identification
problem, which may be in principle difficult to solve, with no loss of information on the long-run properties of the system,
incurring some loss due to the reduced efficiency of estimation but at no cost in terms of consistency of estimators.  See
Sims et al. (1990) for more on this.
27  'he empirical results are qualitatively the same when R is ordered last.
22included to capture the impact of the changes in the terms of external finance (or the combined
impact of the balance sheet and lending channel effects) on economic activity (see Box 2).  It
should be noted that the variable SPR understates the actual magnitude of this effect since the
average lending rate would not entirely capture the increase in cost to the typical bank borrower,
as fewer borrowers qualifv for this rate during tight money episodes.
The VARs are estimated using monthly data from 1992:01 to  1998:12, including 12 lags of
the relevant quantitative variables. 28 The estimated VAR coefficients are not in themselves very
interesting  and thus  are not  reported  here.  Instead, the  impulse response  functions  and the
variance decompositions are reported.  In order to assess the overall quantitative  impact of a
monetary tightening and the credit  channel effects  on production of  SMIs relative to  LMFs,
Figures  16 and  17 plot  the  impulse  response  functions  of  ySME  and  yL  with  respect  to
innovations in the interest rate and the spread residuals over a horizon of 36 months (Appendix 2
reports the overall results of this exercise).  Standard errors are calculated by the Monte Carlo
method, with  1000 repetitions and standard error bands (of  ±  2 standard deviations) are also
included. 29
28  All data are obtained from the Central Bank, Department of Statistics, and JP Morgan.  In terms of lag selection, a sequence
of (likelihood ratio) exclusions tests favored 12 lags against 10 and  8 lags.
29  The Monte  Carlo standard errors are computed  as follows. At each  repetition,  a random  sample  from the asymptotic
distribution of the VAR coefficients is drawn. The asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficients is given in Hamilton
(1994). From these simulated coefficients, the impulse response functions are computed. After repeating this process 1000
times, the 95% confidence interval, by the percentile method, is constructed. The standard errors reported are the standard
deviations of the simulated impulse responses across 1000 replications.
23Figure  16: Impulse  Response  Functions:  Large Manufacturing  Firms
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Figure 17: Impulse Response Funcitions:  SMIs
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24effect  of  the  monetary  impulse  on  Y"  dies  away.  Monetary  shocks  have  a  negative  and
statistically significant impact on ySMI  in the first ten months and, thereafter, they are statistically
insignificant until the nineteenth month.  Indeed, ySMI  experiences the largest decline following a
monetary shock after nineteen months: a I percent standard deviation shock to R reduces ySMI by
roughly 4 percent.  The effect of the monetary impulse on YSMI  dies away after twenty months.
Adverse effects of SPR shocks on economic activity occur faster than those of R shocks.
A one standard deviation shock to SPR has the largest statistically significant impact on yL  after
9 months, at which point  yL  declines by 0.8 percent.  However, SPR shocks do not have any
statistically significant effect on Y" after nine months.  On the other hand, the largest statistically
significant decline in ysMI in response to a one standard deviation shock to SPR takes place even
earlier, after seven months, at which point ysMI  decreases by  1.4 percent.  The effect of SPR
shocks on ySME  dies away after 13 months.
Variance decompositions lend further support to the disproportionate effects of monetary
policy on  ySM1.31  Looking at a decomposition of the forecast error variance of production of
both SMI and LMFs over a 36-month horizon, indicates that almost 71 percent of the forecast
error  variance  of  ySMI  can  be  accounted  for  by  shocks  to  interest  rates,  whereas  the
corresponiding contribution for  yL  iS around  30 percent  (Figures  18 and  19).  SPR  shocks
contribute roughly 8 percent and  10 percent of the forecast error variances of yL  and of ysMl,
respectively. 32 The results also indicate that yL  explains almost 60 percent of its forecast error
variance, whereas  YsMI  explains  nearly  12 percent  of  its  forecast  error variance.  It  is  also
The forecast error variance  decomposotion indicates the proportion of the movements  in a sequence due to  its "own"
shocks versus shocks to the other variables.
Once again. it should be noted that since the variable SPR is likely to understate the magnitude of credit channel effects due
to the reason previously explained, the results are likely to be biased toward finding relatively larger contribution of R
shocks to forecast error variances of both ysMI  and yL  than those of SPR shocks.
25-interesting to note that RER shocks explain only 3 percent of the forecast error variance of  yL,
while they explain nearly 10 percent of the forecast error variance of ySMI,
Figure  18. Variance  Decompositions:  Large  Manufacturing  Firms
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Figure  19. Variance Decompositions: SMIs
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.,The  implications  of  the  empirical  analysis  can  be  summarized  by  the  following:  (i)
monetary policv  shocks have  a larger effect  on the production  of SMIs compared to  that  of
I.MFs; (ii) the effect of monetary impulse on the production of SMIs dies away more quickly
than that of SMIs (after twelve months versus after twenty months); (iii) SPR shocks capturing
the credit channel effects on economic activity also have a larger impact on the production of
SMIs: their impact, however, is quantitatively smaller than that of monetary shocks; 33 and (iv)
variance decompositions also provide further support to the disproportionate effects of monetary
policy on SMIs: R and SPR shocks contribute substantially more to the 36-month variance of the
production of SMIs.
Therefore,  the  empirical  results  underscore  that  SMIs  suffer  disproportionately  from
monetary shocks. 34 This  finding confirms earlier studies,  mainly on  industrialized countries,
[Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) and Gertler and Gilchirst (1994)] and provides further support to
the notion that SMIs face greater market imperfections, which in turn amplifies the effects of a
given  policy  shift.  Since  SMIs  are  likely  to  be  firms  with  highly  profitable  investment
opportunities, this  finding has important policy implications for  social welfare.  Not  only  do
recessions cause a decline in aggregate output and investment, but the declines themselves are
inefficient.
It needs to be reiterated that  since the variable SPR is likely to understate the magnitude of credit channel effects, the
procedure seems clearly biased toward finding relatively larger R shocks than SPR shocks;
It is possible that non-financial factors might also account for the differences in small and large firm behavior after tight
money.  A host of studies quoted  in this paper, however, has demonstrated that  balance  sheet liquidity constrains the
spending  of smaller  firms,  particularly  around  episodes  of tight money;  while the same  is not true for large  and high grade
companies.  All this suggests  that financial  factors  are at work.
275. Conclusions
This paper aimed to accomplish two goals.  First, it intended to provide a brief descriptive
analysis of Malaysian credit and monetary conditions in the aftermath of the crisis.  Second, it
aimed to empirically investigate the response of small and medium size industries (SMIs) as well
as large manufacturing firms (LMFs) to monetary policy shifts in Malaysia in order to shed light
on the distributional consequences of monetary policy actions.
Ihe  results  from  the  descriptive  analysis  suggest  that  "payoff'  or  "default"  risk,  as
captured bJv  the spread between risky and safe debt, is still well above its pre-crisis level, thus
underscoring the increased agency costs of external finance.  The analysis underscores that the
decline in lending activity between the end of 1997 and the first half of 1998 can be attributed to
the recluction in bank credit supply relative to demand.  It appears that the decline in demand has
probably played a more prominent role in contributing to the sharp slow-down in lending activity
during the second half of  1998, compared to the earlier period.  The descriptive analysis also
suggests that  customers  borrowing  exclusively  from  banks  that  experienced  deposit  flight,
namely merchant banks, finance  companies, and for  a very short period  domestic banks, are
likely to find it more difficult to acquire new credit.  Indeed, this implies that the phenomenon of
deposit flight hurt  SMIs disproportionately, as they are likely to have a customer relationship
with only a single bank.
The results of the  empirical investigation  suggest that  monetary tightening has  a larger
impact on  SMIs than it does  on LMFs.  The empirical findings  point  out that  the effect  of
monetary shocks on production is more persistent for SMIs than for LMFs.  Moreover, monetary
shocks, over a 36 month horizon, contribute substantially more to the variance of the production
of SMIs than that of large mranufacturing firms: 71 percent  versus 30 percent.  Therefore, the
empirical results lend support to the existence of credit market imperfections and underscore the
28importance  of  distributional  consequences of  policy  shifts.  More  specifically,  the  findings
corroborate the notion that SMIs face greater market imperfections which, in turn, magnify the
effectx of a given policy shift.
There are two main policy implications emerging from the thrust of the overall findings.
First, policy makers should take distributional consequences of policy actions into account in
heir decision making process.  The finding that SMIs bear a disproportionate share of the burden
of monetary contraction has serious implications for social welfare.  The fact that SMIs account
for  more  than  80  percent  of  total  manufacturing  establishments  and  that  they  contribute,
respectively, 13.8 percent and 17.4 percent of total output and employment combined with the
favorable evidence on their efficiency relative to large firms suggests the following: not only do
aggregate output and investment decline in response to monetary contractions, but the declines
themselves may be inefficient. 35
Second, since the empirical findings lend support to the idea that SMIs face greater market
imperfections, there could be benefits in providing assistance to SMIs which disproportionately
suffer from asymmetric information problems.  This recommendation is, in fact, consistent with
the authorities' effort  to assist SMIs through various schemes: a general policy recommendation
in  this  respect  would  be  to  consider  measures to  alleviate information  asymmetry  in  credit
markets. 36 To this end, the promotion of SME cooperative or mutual  guarantee schemes that
reduce infolmation asymmetry in credit markets can prove useful. 37 Mutual guarantee schemes
have  been widely used  in  Southern Europe  by groups  of  firms  -- usually  within a  specific
industry -- to provide a privately organized "insurance system" for lending banks, thus enabling
See Ghosh and Chinn (1994) and Rosli (1996) on the relative efficiency of SMIs and large firms.
36  Although investigation of the effectiveness of these schemes is an important issue, it is beyond the scope of this study.
37  See Hughes ( 1997) for more on this.
29the banks to rely less on the assets of individual companies within the group in making loan
decisions.  The poolilng effects of this  system, in turn, reduce the risk to the bank of default,
thereby decreasing informational asymmetries between the banks and the firms.  This market
based solution provides, not only a guarantee, but also an incentive for an individual member of
these mutual societies to reveal information to the society that they would hesitate to provide to
the bank.
Finally, the debate over whether or not the monetary tightening was excessive in the crisis
countries has so far overlooked the asymnmetric  effects of monetary policy.  A myriad of studies
has succeeded in establishing the empirical importance of the asymmetric effects of monetary
policy on output and prices.3 8 This strand of literature has demonstrated that negative shocks
affect output more strongly in absolute terms than positive shocks do.  To the extent that this also
holds for Malaysia and for the other crisis countries, neglecting this aspect of monetary policy
might have contributed to an economic recovery that has been slower-than-expected.
38  See, for instance, Weise (1999), Kandil (1995), Morgan (1993), and Cover (1992).
30Appendix 1: Definition of Small and Medium-Size Industries and the Break-down of
Manufacturing Components of Industrial Production Index in Malaysia
In  January  1998, the  Minister  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  announced  a  new
definition  for  SMIs.  According  to  the  new  definition,  refering  only  to  companies  in  the
manufacturing sector, SMI is defined as a company with full-time employees not exceeding 150
and with an annual sales turnover not  exceeding RM25 million.  Two categories of SMIs are
identified:
*  Snmall  Scale Company: A company with full-time employees not exceeding 50 and an annual
sale turnover not exceeding RM 10 million.
*  MXledlium  Scale  Company:  A  company  with  fill-time  employees  between  51  and  150
employees, with an annual sales turnover of more than RM 10 million to RM 25 million.
SMIs play a  crucial role  in Malaysia's  industrialization program by  strengthening both
forward and backward industrial linkages.  The Second Industrial Master Plan contains policies
and programs to further develop and integrate domestic SMIs as the critical and strategic link to
develop and strenghten the cluster formation and to increase domestic value-added.  According
to the Plan, the  SMIs will assume these roles by  complementing the  activities of large-scale
industries via integration into the mainstream of industrial development, through the provision of
critical parts and components, as well as by expanding their markets internationally.
Currently, SMIs constitute more than 80 percent of the total manufacturing establishments;
they contribute  13.8 percent to total  output and  17.4 percent to employment. The majority of
SMIs are still concentrated in the traditional areas indicated below (the percentage distribution of
the SMI establishment in various sectors are indicated in parantheses):
*  Food and beverages (20 percent);
*  Fabricated metal products (18 percent);
*  Wood and wood products (17 percent);
*  Basic metal (4%).
31The table below illustrates the breakdown of manufacturing components of industrial
production:
Table  Al.  Break-down of Manufacturing Components of Industrial Production Index
Industry  Group  Weight
I  Food manufacturing  6.34
2  Beverage industries  0.63
3  Tobacco industries  0.86
4  T1extiles  2.18
5  Wearing apparel except footwear  1.75
6  Footvear except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic footwear  0.08
7  Wood, wood & cork products except furniture  5.42
8  Paper & paper products  1.19
9  Industrial chemicals  6.63
10  Other chemical products  1.67
1  1  Crude oil refineries  0.96
12  Misc. products of petroleum & coal  0.29
13  Rubber products  3.72
1  4  Plastic products, n.e.c.  2.59
1  5  Glass & glass products  0.46
1  6  Non-metallic mineral products  2.97
17  Iron & steel basic industries  2.23
1  8  Non-ferrous basic industries  0.58
19  Fabricated metal products except machinery & equipment  3.19
20  Machinery except electrical  2.94
21  Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances & supplies  20.23
22  Transport equipment  2.57
23  Professional & scientific & measuring & controlling equipment, n.e.c.  0.95
70.43
Source:  Department  ofStatistics
32Appendix  2: Impulse  Response Functions:  SMIs versus  Large Manufacturing  Firms
Impulse  Response Functions:  Large  Manufacturing  Firms
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